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Abstract 
We suggest that both Marxist theories of the state as  well as theories of social movements 
inadequately consider the potential class based social movements organized by the very wealthy. 
The concentration on mass movements by both bodies of theory has shortchanged the study of 
elite organizations. We explore the existence and behavior of these elite social movements 
(ESMOs) by examining the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), an organization deeply 
embedded in the New Right Movement. The CPD sought to replace Jimmy Carter's conflict 
management foreign and military policies with a militaristic interventionist foreign policy harking 
back to the cold war. Over forty of the CPD's directors were drawn from the upper class as 
defined by G. W. Domhoff. The bulk of the other 100 directors came from elite military, civilian 
government, and academic backgrounds. The CPD meets all six expectations of ESMO 
organization and behavior the authors derived from theories of social movements and the state. 
Moreover, available evidence suggests that the CPD has had significant influence over the United 
States Federal Government's foreign and military policies. We conclude that both theories of the 
state and of social movements could benefit by acknowledging the existence and importance of 
ESMOs. We speculate that ESMOs will prove to be important forces a t  work shaping society 
during periods when the state undertakes major changes in behavior despite the lack of powerful 
mass movements, support of pre-existing elite institutions or obvious commitment to the policy 
changes by the state. 
Introduction 
An important agent of social change in contemporary society is the activity of social 
movement organizations (SMOs). The most common contemporary target of such organizations 
has been the state. Therefore, despite limited overlap, research concerning social movements and 
research examining the operation of the state are fundamentally and inextricably linked. This . 
linkage goes beyond just a set of common subject materials, but also includes a common flaw; their 
failure to address the organization of high level elites into social movement organizations. 
Even a cursory overview of the literature on social movements would reveal the 
fundamental observation that little theory or research exists about elite social movement 
organizations (ESMOs). This could be attributable to two causes. Either this paucity could be due 
to lack of elite movement organizations to study, or it could be due to the inability of current 
theory to "notice" them. That is, they either do not exist or theory has constrained the definition 
of social movement organizations to preclude the possibilityaf elite movement organizations. The 
answer chosen has important ramifications for the two bodies of theory in sociology most 
concerned with processes of social change and political organizing, Marxist theories of the state 
and social movement theories. This paper investigates two questions. First, is there such a thing 
as  an elite social movement organization? Second, what are the implications of elite movement 
organizations for theories of social movements and the state? 
The principal focus of this effort is the Committee for the Present Danger (1976-current), 
an upper-class organization dedicated to the resurrection of "a militarized doctrine of containment 
as  the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy" (Sanders 1983:8). An investigation of this organization 
is undertaken to assess its qualifications as  a social movement organization. The first step in this 
task is to define the central characteristics of social movement organizations and see whether the 
CPD fits these criteria. 
Literature Review 
This effort examines this question from two theoretical viewpoints, each of which has 
something to say about social movements and elites. The first approach is resource mobilization 
theory, a perspective directly concerned with the factors accounting for the formation, duration 
and success of social movements and their interaction with elites. The second theoretical tradition 
that we discuss is theories of the state. These theories deal with power relations in society, 
theories concerning the operation of SMOs and their most common targets. 
Resource Mobilization Theory 
The resource mobilization theory of social movements currently represents the dominant 
theory in the field (Jenkins 1983). This body of scholarship views social movements as rationally 
motivated and directed enterprises (Garrison 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1973; 1977; Oberschall 
1973; Tilly 1978). In essence, social movement behavior is equated with political behavior 
(Halebsky 1976); they both have as their goal the influence or attainment of power. However, 
social movements are unique in that power is exercised not through institutional channels but by 
the very fact of being outside of these channels (Jenkins 1985; Jenkins and Eckert 1986; McAdam 
1982; 1983; Piven and Cloward 1977). By utilizing "negative inducements" social movements are 
believed to influence those in power to concede to the demands of the insurgent group (McAdam 
1983: 19). 
Although there are a number of variations within resource mobilization theory (McAdam 
1982; McCarthy and Zald 1973; Morris 1984; Pichardo 1988a), they all share common 
conceptions about the possibility of elite movement organizations. Since movements are powered 
by their use of non-institutional "negative inducements," one must question why groups that 
already possess power would form movement organizations especially when their power base lies 
firmly within the cofllnes of institutional networks. One need only look a t  the principal 
movements that have dominated the studies of resource mobilization theorists (civil rights, women 
and farm workers) to see that social movements are considered as  vehicles for impoverished or 
oppressed groups to attain power. 
This is further supported by the view that social movements are rationalistically motivated 
endeavors, subject to costhenefit analyses. In this view it would make little sense for elites to 
form SMOs since the costs would likely outweigh the benefits. Groups usually embark on social 
movements only when other less costly avenues of influence are unavailable or unresponsive. 
With elites this would not be the case for they have available to them a number of influence 
avenues (Domhoff 1983). Thus, the image conveyed by resource mobilization theory is that elite 
SMOs do not exist because they would likely produce minimal if any marginal returns. This 
view is further supported by the observation that there are almost no examples of elite movement 
organizations studied by resource mobilization theorists. 
Theories of State 
Not only does the social movement literature fail to acknowledge the existence and 
importance of the ESMOs, but the theory of the state literature skirts this issue as  well. In 
general, class theorists see social movements as  almost entirely a working class phenomenon. 
Elites of all types, especially economic elites, are seen a s  not needing to form powerful, well 
organized movements. The concentration of resources in the hands of a few plus the common 
material interests and the high degree of class consciousness of the wealthy are seen as making it 
possible for economic elites to further their interests without a high degree of social movement 
mobilization (Alford and Friedland 1985). Still, the different theoretical perspectives under the 
class theorist rubric give elite mobilizations different emphasis. 
Under the umbrella of the class theorists three perspectives are usually identified (Gold, 
Lo, and Wright 1975; Whitt 1979). The Marxist structuralists concentrate on the structure of 
capitalist society and how that determines both the structure and function of the state (Offe and 
Ronge 1975). The deterministic nature of this body of scholarship effectively excludes from 
significant consideration the impact of attempts by groups and individuals to actively influence the 
behavior of the state. The state is an actor relatively autonomous from deliberate organized 
human action (Poulantzas 1973). This means that not only are the mobilizations of the very rich 
and powerful largely ignored by this literature, but the machinations of the impoverished are also 
considered peripheral to the important processes in state and society. 
A second central array of class theory regarding the state is the instrumentalist 
perspective. This is the most traditional perspective, viewhg the state as an instrument of the 
upper class (first explicated by Marx in Kapital, The 18th Brurniere, and other works). , Unlike the 
structuralists who see the state as  relatively autonomous, the instrumentalists see the state as  
wholly under the control of the owners of the means of production. The high level of obedience is 
maintained by the state being peopled with members of the upper class, with large transfusions of 
cash and other resources into the hands of state officials, and with the control the upper class 
maintains over the private sector. The iron fisted control over the state and the rest of society is 
considered the natural outgrowth of owning the means of production. Here again the 
concentration of resources and class consciousness of the elites in the capitalist societies makes it 
unnecessary for them put much deliberate work into organizing themselves to further their 
material interests. As individuals they can wield adequate power to get what they want (see for 
example Meadow 1983). Moreover, working class movements, while of interest, are not 
considered an important factor in determining public policy outcomes, except to the extent they 
cause official reactions to their attempts to influence society and the state. 
The class-dialectical theorists such as  G. William Domhoff (1970; 1983) and J. Allen Whitt 
(1979; 1980; 1982) posit a different view on the role of the state and working class social 
movements. Rather than seeing working class social movements as largely ineffective throughout 
much of the history of a society, class-dialectical theorists suggest that the state is a central arena 
of conflict between and within the classes. This conflict is also considered far from one-sided. 
Working class social movement organizations are sometimes able to influence the state into 
working for their interests as  Dornhoff describes in The Higher Circles (1970). This means that 
members of the upper classes must constantly be on guard and active against such activity. 
While the organization and mobilization of non-elites is given significance by the class-dialectical 
model, the economic elites are considered to have sufficient individual resources so as  to make only 
the loosest non-institutional political organizations necessary to counter the vast majority of 
working class social movements. Although permanent elite political organizations do exist -- e.g. 
Council on Foreign Relations, Conference Board, Trilateral Commission -- these organizations are 
there essentially to assist individual and groups of capitalists in working towards consensus 
solutions to pressing problems rather than to mobilize resources towards accomplishing significant 
social change (Domhoff 1983). Even lobbying groups such as  the Chamber of Commerce and the 
National Association of Manufacturers are viewed as  status quo oriented special interest 
organizations rather than a s  social movement organizations by the class-dialectical theorists. 
Although the theories discussed represent differing perspectives on how society is 
organized and operates, they do share some common conceptions of the propriety of elite social 
movement organizations. Both of the theories view ESMOs as  foregone conclusions. The resource 
mobilization literature indicates that it makes no rational sense for elites to engage in such 
activity, that the costs of such enterprises would outweigh their benefits and that the necessity of 
forming a social movement is pre-empted by their power within institutional channels and by the 
capacity of the upper class to build and maintain political consensus. State theories would 
basically agree with this position because the power of elites would make such endeavors 
unnecessary and unlikely, except when unusual conditions prevail, e.g. the Great Depression. 
However, there are a few problems associated with these approaches. For resource 
mobilization theory the problems stem from a static conception of political behavior and 
assumptions concerning the power of institutional channels. If social movements are indeed to be 
considered within the spectrum of political behavior, a s  a kind of political behavior, then it seems 
somewhat artificial to constrict this behavior to one segment of the population. Of course, 
resource mobilization theory would respond to this by saying that it is not that they could not 
exist, but that given the actors' rational disposition, elite SMOs would not be expected rationally. 
This view, however, hinges on the assumption concerning the power of institutional 
channels. For it assumes that the power that elites exercise within institutional channels is 
sufficient to accomplish their goals. If this is not the case then there might be cause for elites to 
form SMOs. When we take a close look a t  institutionalized power we see that such a position 
restricts the use of power just as  much as  it enhances it. For example, during the civil rights 
movement the municipal authorities in Montgomery found that their legal authority could be 
successfully circumvented. Their response was to take advantage of non-institutional means of 
social control by forming the White Citizens' Council (WCC). Available evidence indicates that 
many prominent white Southerners were believed to be involved with the WCC (McMillen 1971). 
The White Citizens' Council, much like any other SMO, sought to exercise power by using non- 
institutionalized channels of influence. Their campaign of repression, terror, bombings and 
murder is well-documented. 
The WCC members' decision to utilize terror a s  a means of social control was not only 
linked to their desire to prevent African-Americans from sharing power but also to the fact that 
their use of legitimate authority a s  an agent of repression had been severely handicapped by the 
civil rights movement. In essence, the use of institutionalized power is governed by rules that are 
often determined and enforced by actors outside the local arena of conflict. These rules limit the 
behavior of authorities just as  they empower them. Faced with this limitation, elite Southerners 
formed, backed and supported the White Citizens' Council as  a means of circumventing the 
limitations placed on legitimate authority.' 
It should also be kept in mind that elites do not represent a unified group, that there may 
be divisions and factions within the elite (Jenkins 1985; McAdam 1982; Shoup 1980; Ferguson 
and Rogers 1981). Therefore, movement organizations may become useful when an elite faction is 
competing against other elite factions. Through such organizations elites could create an 
independent source for gathering and disseminating information and resources supportive of their 
interests. This may be desired since elites often share institutional power and thus elite factions 
rarely have the ability to freely exploit the full power of the institution. 
Another example of a social movement organization formed by elites was the Associated 
Farmers, a group created and sponsored by the agricultural growers in California in the 1930s to 
combat trade unionism in the farm fields. 
So it seems that when channels of legitimate authority are limited or constrained in their 
capacity to pursue or protect elite interests, elites may be rationally motivated to form movement 
organizations. And, just a s  in the case of typical SMOs, they are formed in order to liberate their 
tactical repertoire. Thus, resource mobilization theory is shortsighted in its failure to recognize 
ESMOs. 
However, it may be argued that the social movement literature has dealt with elite 
mobilization except that it has done so under the heading of counter-movement organizations. We 
do not fundamentally disagree with the view that counter-movement organizations often are 
constituted by elites. Indeed, we recognized the White Citizensy Council as  a prime example of an 
elite movement organization. I t  is true that elites often mobilize in reaction to events that 
threaten their hold on power, in fact, we phrase this as one of the principal reasons for elite 
mobilization when such threats cannot be adequately dealt with through institutionalized channels. 
However, relegating elites solely to reactive modes of movement formation artificially restricts the 
range of elite movement behavior. Such a view assumes that elites are highly unified. This 
assumption fails to recognize that elites, especially economic elites, do not all have identical 
interests. That resource mobilization theory mostly ignores the ramifications of this for the 
formation of non-countermovement elite groups is surprising considering that the model does 
acknowledge that elites are not a unified bloc (Jenkins 1985; Jenkins and Perrow 1978; McAdam 
1983; Morris 1984; Pichardo 1988a). I t  is therefore our contention that elites mobilize not only in 
reaction to the efforts of the working class but also to the constraints provided by other elite 
groups. But more importantly, elites also take the initiative in organizing and mobilizing to 
advance their own interests, and not just to suppress or counter the advancement of opposing 
interests. This organizing will occur in the absence of direct stimulus from competing groups and 
the life of the organization will not be defined in terms of external threats but in terms of the 
interests of elites. 
Recent work in the class literature indicating that business elites organize themselves into 
remarkably coherent groups with the purpose of effecting sidcant social change points to 
shortcomings in the theory of the state literature. Ashford's research on the role of corporations 
in the 1980 congressional elections (1986) found that large businesses apparently organize 
themselves into effective political units when necessary to counter social changes not in their 
interests. Other researchers have found remarkable degrees of organization and communication 
among large but supposedly competing businesses that are attempting to influence congressional 
decision-making through campaign contributions (see Clawson, Neustadtl, and Bearden 1986; 
Mizruchi and Koenig 1986). Business classes and businesses might also have formed political 
movements during the mid to late seventies for the purposes of stopping environmentalist and 
consumer protection movements formed in the sixties (Useem 1983; 1984). Perhaps most 
importantly, conflicts within the upper class and other elites are seen as major forces behind the 
development of several political movements such as  the Southern Rim Conservatives described by 
Kirkpatrick Sale (1976) and the neo-conservative groups described by Shoup (1980). The 
burgeoning literature on business political organizing suggests that elites, particularly economic 
,- elites, do organize for the purpose of changing state policy outcomes as  well as more global aspects 
of society such as the distribution of wealth. Most of this research, however, looks a t  these 
phenomena as special interest seeking activity little different from normal congressional lobbying 
activity. Thus, despite this new information on the existence and possible power of the political 
organizations of economic elites no explicit acknowledgement is being made of the importance of 
ESMOs in the literature a s  key factors in influencing the behavior of the state. 
We explore the importance of the concept of ESMOs by examining the Committee on the 
Present Danger (CPD). I t  is our belief that such an examination reveals that this organization 
can constitute only an elite social movement organization. Toward this end, we construct a set of 
expectations of the characteristics of an ESMO derived from resource mobilization theory and 
from extant theories of the state. We expect that an  ESMO should have the following 
characteristics: 
1) Much of the membership and leadership of the CPD should be drawn from other 
pre-existing organizations (Tarrow 1983). 
2) The extremely high social status of the CPD membership suggests that the 
organization should rely principally, if not exclusively, on finances and expertise 
rather than manpower and, therefore, not take the shape of a mass-based 
organization (Pichardo 1988b). 
3) The CPD should be motivated by and operate according to rationalistic 
considerations. 
4) The CPD should represent the interests of its particular elite supporters rather 
than that of other groups or elite factions. 
5 )  The CPD should pursue or employ strategies and tactics that they could not 
otherwise pursue within institutional channels2 In addition to these 
characteristics, it is also important to show that the CPD was not formed solely to 
oppose working-class movements. To this end, the reasons for the formation of the 
CPD need to be explored. 
6) The social background of the CPD membership should reflect a significant bias 
towards the upper class as defined by the Marxist theory of the state literature; 
DomhofPs (1983) criteria are used here. 
The focus of our exploration of these expectations is a short case study of the Committee 
on the Present Danger. The goal of this investigation of the CPD is to explore whether it qualifies 
as an ESMO and not just a counter-movement organization. Data for this study are drawn 
heavily from the original research by Jerry W. Sanders (1983) and Laurence Shoup (1980), and 
from various documents published by the Committee or its members. Research on upper class 
families by Michael P. Allen (1987) and Ferdinand Lundberg (1988) as  well a s  Who's Who in 
America (1983; 1987) were also sources for this study. 
The  Committee On the  Present  Danger 
The Committee on the Present ~ a n ~ e r ~  (CPD) was founded in 1976 as  a way of 
countering the newly elected Jimmy Carter's campaign promises of reduction in military 
expenditures, self-determination for other nations, emphasis on human rights, and arms control 
This is not to say that institutional channels will be abandoned or ignored. In fact, given their 
privileged status within these channels we would expect them to be heavily utilized. The CPD 
should engage in both types of behavior. 
In 1950 the first Committee on the Present Danger was founded. This committee was very 
similar to the CPD we describe here. 
(Sanders 1983). This organization is deeply embedded in what many scholars call the New Right 
Movement (Shoup 1980; Sale 1976; Allen 1989; Himmelstein 1990;'Hunter 1981). Twenty-four 
of the founding directors of the CPD are also affiliated with a t  least one of several new right or 
neo-conservative think tanks or policy organizations including the Hoover Institute for the Study 
of War and Revolution, Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, Heritage 
Foundation, and the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy (Sanders 1983; Who's Who 
1983; 1987). 
An important factor in the committee's creation was Jimmy Carter's near total exclusion 
of all of the cold-warrior elites from his administration, despite having two of the most well 
respected cold warriors, Paul Nitze and Dean Rusk, a s  campaign advisors in 1976 (Shoup 1980; 
Sanders 1983). Therefore, in order to remain influential in national politics and promote policies 
more to their liking the cold warriors and their wealthy backers had to organize outside the 
existing mainstream institutional framework centered around the Office of the President and elite 
policy organizations such as  the Council on Foreign Relations and The Brookings Institution 
(Shoup 1980; Sanders 1983; Domhoff 1983). 
The role of previous elite organizations in the formation of the CPD is quite extensive. The 
CPD was founded with 141 directors drawn from the ranks of business, the military, labor, 
academe, and the state plus a larger number of contributing members. Figure 1 provides just a 
sampling of some of the most elite CPD directors and their affiliations. 
Figure 1 about here] 
Among the most prominent members and directors are ex-President Ronald Reagan, David 
Packard, Nathan Glaser, Saul Bellow, and President George Bush (Committee on the Present 
Danger 1981). Moreover, the CPD has director interlocks with many very central upper class 
policy making and consensus building organizations including The Trilateral Commission, The 
Atlantic Council, The Brookings Institution Board of Trustees, The Business Roundtable, The 
Business Council, The Committee for Economic Development, and The Council on Foreign 
Relations. Many directors such as David Packard, C. Douglas Dillon, and John T. Connor hold 
positions on several of these policy groups (Shoup 1980; Who's Who 1987). Overall, founding 
directors are or have been affiliated with over 70 policy, political, or philanthropic institutions. 
These affiations are as diverse as  Nathan Glazer's participation on the Fund for the Republic's 
Communism in American Life Project during the 1950s to Bayard Rustin's directorship of the A. 
Philip Randolph Institute (Who's Who 1987). The vast majority of CPD directors have been 
extremely active politically throughout much of their lives. 
Not only has the CPD directorship been active in other political organizations, but it has a 
great deal of experience with appointed positions in the national government. The directorship 
includes 51 individuals (36% of directors) who held key military and civilian government positions 
before 1976. The most common important government positions once held by directors were in 
the Treasury (8), civilian military administration (6), ex-ambassadors (6), and uniformed officers 
(5). 
In keeping with the tradition of other upper class organizations the CPD also has several 
representatives from organized labor (Domhoff 1983). Lane Kirkland of the AFL-CIO is a director 
of the CPD and the Council on Foreign Relations. The American Federation of Teachers and the 
International Ladies' Garment Workers Union both have two representatives on the CPD's board 
of directors. The Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, Ironworkers International 
Union, International Union of Operating Engineers, and the Plumbers and Pipe Fitter's 
International Union all have a t  least one representative, usually a high official, holding a CPD 
directorship (Sanders 1983). 
The largest single group of current occupations listed for directors of the CPD is university 
professor or president. Of the 48 directors wi th  academic backgrounds eight are or were 
university presidents and 40 are university faculty. Yale Law School, Sarah Lawrence College, 
Howard University, Georgetown University (home of the very conservative and politically active 
Center for Strategic and International Studies), the University of Wisconsin, Harvard University, 
Fletcher School of Law, and many other prestigious institutions are represented on the board 
(Sanders 1983; Shoup 1980). This list of faculty includes such well known and respected 
individuals as  Seymour Martin Lipset of Stanford University, Nathan Glaser of Harvard, and 
Edward Teller, father of the H-bomb and very influential supporter of the Strategic Defense 
Initiative. With the exceptions of only Howard University, Lake Erie College and the University 
of South Carolina, all 23 universities and colleges with academic connections to the CPD were 
among the top 100 universities receiving DOD contracts in the late 1960s (Pursell 1972). 
The CPD reflects a classic pattern of upper class political groups as  described by G. W. 
Domhoff and other scholars of the upper class (Domhoff 1983; Shoup 1980; Useem 1983). 
Directors are drawn from the upper class, managers of major corporations, leaders of a few major 
labor unions, and members of prestigious academic institutions. The upper class and their 
helpers, the power elite, are well represented on the CPD. 
The CPD is, with little doubt, an upper class political organization. Among its 141 
directors and executive committee members are 42 individuals whose multiple directorships, 
membership in elite social clubs such as  the Bohemian Grove, and other corporate leadership 
positions would classify them, according to Dornhoff (1983; 1974), as  members of the national 
upper class. Indeed, the directorship ties, participation in policy making groups, government 
positions, and social club memberships would place the majority of these people in the category 
Michael Useem (1984) calls the inner circle; these are the central movers and shakers of this 
nation's economy and polity. This list includes David Packard, part owner of Hewlett-Packard, 
Richard Mellon Scaife, Arthur Temple, Mary Pillsbury Lord, C. Douglas Dillon, John M. Cabot, 
John T. Connor, and J. Peter Grace (Sanders 1983; Allen 1987; Lundberg 1988; Shoup 1980). 
These individuals are Directors, Chief Executive Officers, Presidents, Vice Presidents, or 
owners of 115 businesses, 44 of them insurance, banking, or investment firms, 31  of them 
industrial or primary extraction firms, and from some of the largest and most influential 
companies including Citibank, Time Inc., Prudential Insurance Co. of America, Olin Corporation, 
Caterpillar Tractor, Stroock, Stroock, and Lavan, and Dillon, Reed, and Co. (Sanders 1983; Who's 
Who 1987). 
Another important facet of the CPD that is necessary to examine is the source of CPD 
funds. For many reasons, not the least of which is the desire for anonymity by many benefactors 
of the CPD, discovery of information on where the CPD gets its money has proven to be much 
more difficult than researching its directorships. Jerry Sanders (1983) notes that a major 
benefactdr of the CPD and of other conservative organizations who has worked very closely with 
the CPD is Richard Mellon Scaife who gave $260,000 to the CPD between 1977 and 1981. The 
Sarah Scaife Foundation, chaired by Richard Mellon Scaife, gave The Heritage Foundation $3.8 
million, The Hoover Institution $3.5 million, The National Strategy Information Center $6 million, 
and the Center for Strategic and International Studies a t  Georgetown University (CSIS) $5.3 
million during the late 1970s and early 1980s (Sanders 1983). The CSIS, an institutional base for 
many of the CPD academic and ex-government directors, also received significant donations from 
the J. Howard Pew foundation, the John M. Olin Foundation (represented on the CPD by Thomas 
S. Nichols), the S.R. Noble Foundation, and the H. Smith Richelson Foundation (Muscative 1986). 
All of these organizations have been linked with the New Right Movement (Allen 1989; 
Himmelstein 1990; Shoup 1980). 
It is interesting to note that in its 1976 statement of goals and guidelines the CPD wrote: 
We are limiting annual contributions from a single source to $10,000. Our 
objective is a broad base of public support. For special projects, particularly those 
appropriate for foundation support and not contained in our regular budget, we 
may accept larger amounts. 
Under no circumstances, will we solicit or accept contributions from companies or 
persons who derive a substantial portion of their income from the defense industry. 
"How the Committee on the Present Danger will Operate -- What it 
Will Do, and What it Will Not Do" 11 November 1976 
These guidelines do not rule out directors connected to the defense industry, nor do they 
rule out donations from foundations linked to defense industrialists. 
The resources the directors of the CPD could potentially use to further the CPDys goal of 
remilitarizing the United States' relationship with the rest of the world are astounding. The 
resources linked to the Olin family for example include a $50 million foundation, $300 million 
family fortune, and a significant, if not controlling, interest in the $1.6 billion Olin Corporation 
(Allen 1987; Standard and Poor's 1979). Richard MellonScaife is the director of the $200 million 
Sarah Scaife Foundation and is linked to the Mellon fortune, worth a t  least $6 billion in 1984. 
David Packard and his family were reported to be worth a t  least $2.1 billion in 1986. John M. 
Cabot is a member of the Cabot family, worth over $350 million in 1979 (Allen 1987). 
Along with the personal and family fortunes connected to CPD members and directors 
there are also considerable institutional and organizational resources that could be tapped to 
further the goals of the CPD. These resources include the leaders and members of 11 large and 
powerful labor unions such as  the United Auto Workers, plus 23 prestigious universities, and 
many Fortune 500 firms including Exxon Corp., Mobil Oil Corp., General Motors, and Allied 
Chemical. Finally there are banks such as Citibank with over $74 billion worth of deposits in 
1979, the largest bank in the United States and the ninth largest in the world based on total 
deposits, as well as insurance firms such as Prudential Insurance Company of America, the 
largest insurance firm in the United States. Add to these resources the qolitical, public relations; 
organizational, and ideological experiences of the directorship and the potential resource base of 
the CPD is incomparable to most any well known social movement organization operating in the 
last 30 years. 
While the CPD certainly has not been able to mobilize all of the resources linked to its 
directorship and members, it has undertaken many activities to further its cause. I t  goes beyond 
the scope of this paper to describe all the political actions of the CPD, but the CPD annual report 
for 1979 does give a sampling of some of the work done by the CPD. During 1979: 
1) Members testified 17 times before Congress, more than all other critics together; 
2) Paul Nitze's SALT 11 paper was updated 11 times; 
3) 479 television and radio programs, press conferences, debates, public forums, etc. 
were given for citizen leaders; and 
4) 400,000 copies of pamphlets and reports were distributed (Sanders, p. 269). 
In addition to this list, the various policy papers, reports and studies published by the CPD 
and its members provided ideological guidance to over 50 affdiated pro-military political groups; 
the CPD became the umbrella organization for many groups trying to increase military spending 
and restart the cold war. For 1978 through 1980 the SALT I1 treaty was the focus of much of 
the CPD's and its affiliated organizations' political efforts. Towards the cause of stopping 
ratification of this treaty the CPD spent over $750,000 before the treaty negotiations were even 
completed (Christian Science Monitor 1979). Affiliated organizations spending larger amounts of 
money to stop SALT 11 included The Coalition for Peace Through Strength with $2.5 million, The 
American Security Council with $3 million, and The Conservative Caucus with $1 million; 
opponents of SALT 11 spent about 14 times as  much money as did treaty supporters (Christian 
Science Monitor 1979). Another hot issue of the time was the Panama Canal Treaty, targeted for 
$1.8 million in effort by the American Conservative Union (Sanders 1983). 
Directors of the CPD also proved to be influential in the academic policy debates 
surrounding United States strategic and military policy. Richard Pipes' article in ~ o m r n e n t a r ~ ~  
entitled "Why the Soviet Union Thinks it Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War" (Pipes 1977) was 
first in a long series of widely cited and influential anti-Soviet articles to come from directors and 
members of the CPD. Colin S. Gray, though not a director of the CPD, is closely associated with 
several of its directors and their home institutions, including Richard Pipes and the Hudson 
Institute. Gray did a great deal to further the CPD's cause with his variously titled pieces on 
political decapitation strategies and victory in nuclear war (see Gray 1981). Some other 
influential and prolific CPD members and associates responsible for developing and disseminating 
the neo-cold warrior ideology of the CPD include Daniel 0. Graham (1977), Donald G. Brennan 
(1975), Edward N. Luttwak (1978), and Paul Nitze (1976-77). 
A common thread running through the intellectual work of the CPD and affiliated 
academics is a very questionable presentation of the military and political relationship between the 
During this time Commentary was edited by Norman and Midge Decter Podhoretz, influential 
CPD directors. Commentary became the intellectual forum for containment militarism, much as  
Foreign Policy did for trilateralism during the 1960s (Sanders 1983). 
Soviet Union and the United States. For example, in a typical paper Colin S. Gray (1978) 
presents data on expected capabilities of Soviet ICBMs for the 1980s. Gray estimated the 
warhead yield for the SS-18 (the most formidable of Soviet ICBMs) as  over two megatons (over 
117 times the yield of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima). Government estimates of the time put 
the upper bounds for this warhead a t  about 1.5 megatons and the mid-range a t  1 megaton 
(Aldridge 1978). By the early 1980s the Reagan administration firmly put the SS-18 warhead 
yield a t  .550 megatons (Dennis 1984). Equally biased estimates (based on little or no information) 
for warhead accuracy, silo hardness, and number of warheads per booster were present 
throughout CPD documents and articles by affiliated academics. Since these numbers are very 
important components of computer simulations predicting the outcomes of nuclear weapons 
exchanges, by using biased estimates the cold warriors could seem to provide empirical evidence 
supporting their positions of United States vulnerability to Soviet attack and of the Soviet 
intention to use nuclear blackmail against the United States. Because there is very little hard 
data on characteristics of the majority of the United States' and Soviet Union's nuclear weapons 
available, classified or otherwise, the CPD did not fear well documented data based criticisms 
(Tsipsis 1983). Moreover, since the major sources of much of this type of data, the military and 
the CIA, shared many of the same policy goals of the CPD there was very little chance of 
government organizations exposing the work of the CPD as  propaganda cloaked in the trappings 
of mainstream scholarship. 
One of the principal targets of these tactics was public opinion, both the attitudes of 
opinion leaders such as  government and business officials and also the general public. To target 
both decision makers as  well as  the mass public is completely rational given the CPDYs exclusion 
from traditional avenues of influence and availability of resources. FO; example, a s  of 1976 CPD 
directors held high management or ownership positions with the Evening News Association, Time, 
Inc., Readers Digest Co., Policy Review, Des Plaines Publishers, and The Tribune-Review. 
Directors were editors or major contributors to 13 journals, dailies, and news magazines, including 
The National Review, Commentary, The Saturdny Review, and Orbis. In a mobilization against 
other elites, the general public is a functionally neutral party. But it does have an impact on 
governmental decisions. Thus, by motivating the general public to support its policies, the CPD 
could gain leverage over the competing elite factions. One of the principal functions of creating the 
CPD was so the pro-milit&y elites could possess a n  independent source for disseminating 
information (Sanders 1983). 
Sanders elegantly states the goals of this elite group: "From its founding on the heels of 
Carter's 1976 victory, the CPD's goal has been unequivocal: to resurrect a militarized doctrine of 
containment as the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy" (1983, p. 8). And the CPD was very 
successful in achieving its objectives. As further stated by Sanders: 
By 1980 Carter's original stated goal of nuclear disarmament, pledge of non- 
intervention, and promised roll back in military spending were no more. In their 
place military spending was on the rise, intervention was once more sanctioned 
with the announcement of the Carter Doctrine, etc., etc. Privately the CPD must 
have rejoiced a t  the turn of events (p. 270). 
The efficacy of the CPD's efforts dramatically increased when Ronald Reagan took office in 
1981. The President appointed many of the directors and members of the CPD to central 
positions in the White House foreign policy and national security elite. Figure 2 lists the 33 
directors and members of the CPD, including Mr. Reagan, who had held key positions in the White 
House or on influential advisory bodies by 1985 (CPD, 1985). 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Among the key positions held by CPD members and directors include Secretary of the Navy John 
F. Lehman, Chief Negotiator for Theater Nuclear Forces Paul Nitze, Secretary of State George P. 
Schultz, United States Representative to the United Nations Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, and Director of 
the CIA, the late William Casey. 
Robert Scheer of the Los Angeles Times wrote, "The personnel and perspectives of the 
Committee are represented amply on the Reagan foreign policy team. Reagan himself belonged to 
the 150.  [sic] member committee, and 23 other members now hold top positions in his 
administration. The list read like a partial Who's Who of the Reagan Administration" (Los Angeles 
Times August 28, 1981 quoted in CPD 1985 p. 11). The outsiders of the 1970s had become the 
insiders of the 1980s. 
Many authors, scholars, and organizations ranging from the John Birch Society to well 
known journalists such as  Robert Scheer to scholars such as  Laurence Shoup and Jerry W. 
Sanders have attributed the CPD with great influence over the United States' foreign and military 
policies. Among the successes claimed by the CPD, its promoters, and its detractors are: 
1) Replacement of the Carter "appeasement oriented" foreign policy elite with old and 
young cold warriors; 
2) Profoundly changing public opinion towards favoring more military spending and a 
more belligerent and bellicose foreign policy (although the best documented polls 
showed changes in public opinion lasting only a few years); 
3) Stopping the ratification of SALT II; 
4) Boosting military spending; 
5 )  Stopping detente; 
6) Putting Ronald Reagan into office; and 
7) Giving respectability to what were once considered alarmist and extremist views. 
Once the Reagan Administration had hired many of the most active and important 
directors and members of the CPD it became less visible and certainly less politically active. For 
many key figures such as  Eugene Rostow of Yale Law School, Richard Pipes of Harvard 
University, and Paul Nitze of Johns Hopkins as well as others both inside and outside academe, 
the movement from jobs allowing them to pursue CPD political activities to jobs with high 
administrative and travel workloads must have severely curtailed their social movement activities. 
Additionally, once inside the institutions originally targeted by the social movement, they could no 
longer lobby as  challenging groups; rather they now found themselves in the unenviable position of 
being a target for other SMOs! The cooptation or institutionalization of SMOs is a common path 
to ultimate dissolution (McCrea and Markle 1989; Piven and Cloward 1977). 
The CPD, according to Sanders and many other authors, proved to be a very influential 
organization. By about 1983, however, after having many of its members take high level 
positions in the White House including the President of the United States, the organization began 
to wind down its activities, largely content with the direction of United States foreign and military 
policy. The CPD is still formally operating today, but with many of its key figures either in 
government or taking up other interests such as  making money, it is no longer nearly a s  active 
and influential a s  it was during the last two years of Jimmy Carter's and the first years of 
Reagan's administrations. 
Another potential causative force in the decline of the CPD was the apparent withdrawal 
of key sources of support. McCrea and Markle's (1989) study of the Nuclear Freeze movement 
cites data from the Forum Institute (1985) detailing the upsurge of foundation support for groups 
and organizations furthering liberal and traditional mainstream approaches to international 
conflict, e.g., traditional deterrence theory, conflict management, and arms control. The Forum 
Institute documents a more than 200% increase in this type of support from less than $16 million 
in 1982 to over $52 million in 1984. Among the foundation contributors cited by the Forum 
Institute a s  supporters of the liberal establishment orientation are organizations such as the J. 
Howard Pew foundation that were once top supporters of groups such a s  the CPD. Possibly this 
increasing support for "liberal establishment" perspectives on the arms race by major upper class 
institutions represented a shift in upper class support from the new cold warrior perspective of the 
CPD to the more mainstream deterrence orientation. Or, it perhaps could be the result of the 
mobilizing of the liberal faction capital into a social movement of its own to counter the successes 
of the CPD. 
Whatever the source of the reduction in the apparent effect of the CPD on United States 
military and foreign policies, the high profile contributions of the CPD to the political direction of 
the national government present in the late 1970s and early 1980s largely ceased by 1985. New 
publications have became fewer, updates of older publications no longer occur, and fundraising 
letters are distributed less often (one of the authors used to get two per year, more recently this 
has dropped to just an occasional letter). A visit to the CPD office in Washington, D.C. during the 
summer of 1986 found a sleepy but spacious office inhabited by a secretary, a couple of young 
interns, and an  assistant administrator. 
The CPD is indeed an organization made up of and supported by elites, especially economic 
elites. To many scholars the organization is structured like most traditional upper class policy 
organizations. Unlike these types of organizations, however, the CPD had a well defined social 
movement agenda. The policy changes promoted by Jimmy Carter's administration and the 
exclusion of the cold warriors from their influential positions in government prompted the 
organization of the CPD. Once the constituents of the CPD were able to gain positions of 
influence within the government it was no longer expedient, necessary, or perhaps legitimate to 
work through the CPD. This highlights the role of the CPD as  a movement organization created 
to utilize extra-institutional tactics. 
Discussion 
The data on the Committee on the Present Danger we provide here strongly indicate that 
the CPD is an ESMO. All of our expectations described a t  the outset of this study are met by this 
organization. The leadership of the CPD is drawn from over 70 preexisting nongovernmental 
political or policy organizations, including some of the most influential such a s  The Council on 
Foreign Relations and The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy. The availability of 
money and special expertise to the CPD allowed it to attain its goals by lobbying elites, 
disseminating ideology through CPD distributed publications (400,000 copies in 1979 alone) and 
through organizations headed by CPD directors, e.g. Time, Inc., American Federation of Teachers, 
Reader's Digest Co., and the expenditure of huge sums of money to run more traditional lobbying 
campaigns (e.g. to stop SALT II). When Jimmy Carter and his supporters denied the old cold 
warrior elite access to the traditional upper class channels of policy influence, the only alternative 
to the founding of a social movement organization would have been to embrace the available 
traditional institutional channels of influence (special interest lobbying) or to sit quietly by while 
Carter's less-militaristic conflict management agenda was enacted. Therefore the primary targets 
of this SMO were not working-class political endeavors, but the actions of the state and the 
consensus of other elites of wealth. Finally, with more than 40 wealthy and highly-connected 
founding directors, to state that the membership of the CPD has an upper class bias is an 
understatement. 
The CPD is, in our view, clearly an elite social movement organization. The impacts of 
this on the resource mobilization theory of social movements and theories of the state are several. 
With regard to resource mobilization theory, it appears that it is overly constricted in its position 
that there are no conditions under which elites would be motivated to form social movement 
organizations. Institutional channels do possess a high degree of power but they also limit the use 
of power or may be controlled by other elite factions. This means that in order to exercise power, 
the dispossessed elites must pursue alternative channels. 
I t  is also worth reiterating that the CPD did not resemble the type of social movement that 
is normally envisioned, that is, a mass movement. But this is only to be expected given the 
resource profile of elite movements (such as  the CPD) versus that of working-class movements. 
Working-class movements of necessity have to rely on people power rather than money power 
because they lack significant financial resources. Elite movements, on the other hand, have the 
advantage of financial and occupational5 resources. They need not worry about maintaining the 
commitment and dedication of a mass following because of their ability to use money as a selective 
incentive. Monetary resources are also an advantage because they are extremely flexible and 
transferable resources (Pichardo 1988b). So it is to be expected that elite movements would 
approximate professional movement organizations (as discussed by McCarthy and Zald) rather 
than mass-based organizations such as  the civil rights movement. ESMOs lack a mass base, 
therefore, any organizational efforts are centered around their monetary and occupational 
resources. 
The extreme concentration of wealth in the upper class means that a very small number of 
individuals, if organized, can have a profound effect on the outcome of state decision processes. 
Therefore, despite (or perhaps because of) the high degree of consensus and overall level of 
For CPD actors this includes positions in large and powerful organizations, academic expertise 
and contacts, experience with Washington politics, just to name a few. 
2 1 
political consciousness present in the upper class, ESMOs are likely to be relatively common. The 
rewards of organizing are probably much higher to the individual person of wealth than to the 
average citizen because so little effort need be devoted to organizing and solidarity building. To a 
large extent the solidarity structures are already in place and to organize a few hundred people 
into a coherent political group is certainly much easier than trying to mobilize the thousands 
necessary to make a mass movement efficacious. Moreover, the significant institutionalization of 
upper class political behavior and organization noted by the class theorists such as Domhoff (1983) 
means that in order for any excluded faction of the upper class to attain its goals, it must form an 
ESMO. 
With the exception of special interest groups the extant theories of the state give little 
weight to the existence or significance of ESMOs. The burgeoning research on class-based political 
organizing and consensus building in conjunction with the apparent importance of the CPD 
indicates that mainstream theories of the state must begin to realize the potential importance of 
studying ESMOs in order to more completely understand the workings of the capitalist state. The 
state is not just an autonomous actor managing the affairs of capital, nor is it strictly the 
instrumental tool of big business. Indeed, even the class-dialectical theorists, who acknowledge the 
impact of conflicts between the class conscious bourgeoisie and the less well organized proletariat 
on the state, seem willing to present an oversimplified picture of the main forces acting on the 
state. The presence of social movements organized, led, and supported almost entirely by a 
wealthy elite, who are but a small fraction of the richest of citizens, must be taken into account 
when the formation, evolution, or elimination of state policies is under examination. 
Even non-Marxist theories of the state must make a special place for the role of elite social 
movements. The dominant pluralist paradigm readily acknowledges the importance of all types of 
political groups, elite or otherwise, to policy development by the state (Alford and Friedland 1985). 
The availability of resources to ESMOs, however, is so much greater than for the vast majority of 
political groups that pluralist theory cannot contribute much to understanding policy making 
processes targeted by ESMOs. The ease with which the CPD and its affiliates swamped the 
supporters of SALT I1 (the CPD was able to spend 14 times the amount spent by its competition), 
despite the support provided by the state apparatus, indicates that pluralist theory is sadly lacking 
in explanatory power. Perhaps Ralph Miliband had ESMOs in mind when he cited the presence of 
"imperfect competition" as a major critique of pluralist theory (1969, p. 146). Without 
acknowledging a special role for ESMOs, pluralist theories of the state will likely never be able to 
adequately explain major changes in state policy making direction such a s  the one spurred by the 
actions of the CPD. 
Conclusion 
We find that the literature on the functioning of the state and on the behavior and effects 
of social movements shows several common concerns. These two literatures also pay little 
attention to social movement organizations organized, supported, and peopled by the highest level 
of elites. The case we examine here, the Committee on the Present Danger, fits the central 
criteria defining a social movement. The evidence is clear; ESMOs do form in contemporary 
society. 
The existence and apparent efficacy of ESMOs indicates that they are probably important 
causal agents in setting the course of social change in capitalist societies. Researchers concerned 
with either SMOs or the state should look for the presence of ESMOs in order to be able to more 
adequately understand the nature of social change in a complex society. We speculate that 
ESMOs might prove to be important forces a t  work shaping society during periods when the state 
undertakes major changes in behavior despite the lack of powerful mass movements, support of 
pre-existing elite institutions or obvious commitment to the policy changes by the state. Surely 
ESMOs deserve a great deal more scrutiny by scholars of the state and social movements than 
they have been given. 
s 
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Figure 1. 
A Sampling of Elite Directors of the Committee on the Present Danger and their Affiliations* 
Director Name Affiliation 
Theodore C. Achilles Vice Chairman, Atlantic Council 
Former Ambassador, Peru 
Director, Eastman Kodak Co., International Management and 
Development Institute 
NATO pact negotiator, planning conference, CENTO, SEATO, 
and Columbo organizations 
Co-editor, Atlantic Community Journal (1963-75) 
Member of the Alibi, Yale, and Brook Clubs 
Karl R. Bendetsen 
John M. Cabot 
W. Glenn Campbell* * 
Peter B. Clark 
Former Under Secretary of the Army 
Consulting Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (1948) 
Director General, U.S. railroads (1950-52) 
Chairman of the Board of Directors, Panama Canal Co. 
Vice President of Operations, Champion Paper 
CEO, Chairman of the Board, President, Champion International 
Director, Member of the Executive Committee, Westinghouse 
Electric 
Governing Board, N.Y. Stock Exchange 
Directed evacuation of Japanese from the West Coast 
Member of the Links, Metropolitan, Brook, Chicago, Washington 
Athletic, Bohemian, Pacific Union, Houston Country, 
Petroleum, Tejas, Bayou, Washington F Street, Georgetown, 
Everglades, and Bath and Tennis Clubs 
Former Ambassador to Sudan, Colombia, Brazil, and Poland 
Director, Hoover Institute, Stanford University 
Advisory Board, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Georgetown 
Board of Directors, NSF 
Regent, University of California 
Member of the Bohemian Grove, Cosmos, and Commonwealth 
Clubs 
President of Evening News Association 
Former Chairman, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
Member of Detroit Athletic, Detroit Country, and Economics 
Clubs 
* Adapted from Shoup (1980) and Sanders (1983); affiliations from Who's Who in America (1983; 
1987). 
** Individuals with direct with New Right foundations and thinktanks described by 
Hirnmelstein (1990) and Allen (1989) are shown in bold face type. 
John B. Connally 
John T. Connor 
C. Douglas Dillon 
Henry H. Fowler 
Former Secretary of the Treasury 
Former Secretary of the Navy 
Former Governor of Texas 
Partner, Vinson and Elkies 
Director, Justin Industries, Falconbridge Nickel Mines, Ltd., 
First City Bancorp of Texas, Inc., First City National Bank of 
Floresville, Continental Airlines, Inc., and Dr. Pepper Co. 
Trustee, Andrew W. Mellon Foundation 
Member of Houston Chamber of Commerce, Conference Board 
Member and Director of the Houston Metropolitan Racquet Club 
President, Allied Chemical 
Former Secretary of Commerce 
Director of J. Henry Schroeder Bank and Trust Co., G.M., ABC, 
Schroders Ltd., and Merck & Co. 
Member of Business Council, Council on Foreign Relations 
Trustee, Syracuse University 
Former Secretary of Treasury 
Former Member of U.S. Stock Exchange 
Former Director of U.S. and Foreign Securities Corp. 
Director and Chair, Dillon, Reed, & Co. 
Former Chairman, Rockefeller Foundation 
Former Trustee, Brookings Institute 
President of Board of Overseers, Harvard University 
Member of Society of Colonial Wars, N.Y. 
Member of Racquet and Tennis, Knickerbocker, Links, River, 
Century, Pilgrims, and Metropolitan Clubs 
Partner, Goldman, Sachs & Co. 
Former Secretary of the Treasury 
Vice Chairman, Atlantic Council 
Member of the Conference Board 
Member of the Recess River (NYC), Links, and Metropolitan 
Clubs 
William H. Franklin Former Chairman, Caterpillar Tractor Co. 
Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen Former Congressman 
Investment Broker (NYC) 
Trustee, Howard Savings Bank 
J. Peter Grace President, W.R. Grace & Co. 
Director, Brascom Ltd., Ingersoll-Rand Co., Stove and Webster, 
Inc., Omnicare, Roto Rooter Inc., Universal Furniture Ltd. 
and Miken  & Co. 
Trustee, Atlantic Mutual Inc. 
Director, Boys Club of America 
Chairman, Radio Free Europe 
Trustee, Grace Institute 
Member of Council on Foreign Relations 
Member of Racquet and Tennis, Madison Square Garden, Links, 
India House, Meadow Brook, Pacific Union, and Everglades 
Clubs 
J.C. Hurewitz 
Belton K. Johnson 
Max M. Kampelman 
Leon H. Keyserliig 
James A. Linen IV 
Clare Boothe Luce 
Director, The Middle East Institute, Columbia University 
Former researcher, Rand Corporation 
Consultant to the Departments of State and Defense, Council on 
Foreign Relations, ABC News, Stanford Research Institute, 
and International Institute for Strategic Studies 
Chairman, Chaporrosa Agri-Services Inc. 
Former Manager, King Ranch, Texas 
Director, Campbell Soup, ST&T, Tenneco, First City Bancorp of 
Texas 
Former Director, Active Communication on Critical Choices for 
Americans 
Former Co-Chair, Republican National Committee 
Member of the Capital Hill, River, Racquet and Tennis, Cover 
Valley, Rod and Gun, Order of the Alamo, and Links Clubs 
Attorney, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Karnpelman 
Chairman, Former Director, District of Columbia National Bank 
Director, Georgetown University 
Director, Atlantic Council 
Member of the Cosmos, Federal City, and National Press Clubs 
President and Founder, Conference on Economic Progress 
Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors under President 
Truman 
Director of "various companies" 
Member of the Cosmos, Harvard, and Columbia University 
(Washington, D.C.) Clubs 
Director and former President of Time Inc. 
Executive V.P., National Enquirer (1976-7) 
Owner, DesPlanes Publishers 
V.P., Media General Inc. 
CEO, Media General Broadcast Services Inc. 
Chairman of the Board, American Thai Corp. 
Member, Economic, Racquet of Chicago, Round Hill, Country of 
Virginia, Commonwealth, Yale, Brook, and Farmington 
Country Clubs 
Author 
Forrrier Member of Congress 
Ambassador to Italy 
Member Academy of Policy Science, American Institute for 
Foreign Trade 
Director, American Security Council 
Member, Hawaii's Foundation of American Freedom, U.S. 
Strategic Institute, and the Daughters of the American 
Revolution 
Donald S. MacNaughton Chairman and CEO, The Prudential Insurance Company of 
America 
CEO, Hospital Corp. of America 
Chair, Executive Committee, Exxon Corp. 
Director, Third National Corp., New York Stock Exchange 
Trustee, Vanderbilt University 
Member, Business Council 
Member of the Eastward Ho, Sailfish Point, Links, and Belle 
Meade Clubs 
William McChesney Martin, Jr.  Former Chairman, Federal Reserve Board 
Member, New York Stock Exchange (1931-38) 
Board of Directors, Import-Export Bank 
Chair, Federal Reserve Board (1951-70) 
Director, Freeport Minerals Co., Scandinavian Securities Corp. 
Member of the West Side Tennis, Yale, Metropolitan, Alibi, and 
Chevy Chase Clubs 
George C. McGhee 
Steven Muller 
Thomas S. Nichols 
George Olmsted 
Former Under Secretary of State for Public Affairs 
Former Ambassador to Turkey 
Owner, McGhee Production Co. (oil) 
Chairman of the Board, Saturday Review 
Director, Mobil Corp., Procter & Gamble Co., American Security 
Bank, and Transworld Airlines 
Member, Atlantic Council 
Board of Directors, Vassar College, American University 
Member of the Metropolitan, City Tavern, Brook, and 
Bohemenian Grove Clubs 
President, The Johns Hopkins University 
Director, CSX Corp., Safeway Corp., Organization Counselors 
Inc., Millipore Corp. and Beneficial Corp. 
Board of Editors, Daedalus 
Member of AAAS, Committee for Economic Development, 
Council on Foreign Relations, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies 
Member of the Cosmos and Center Clubs 
President, Nichols Co. 
Former Chairman, Executive Committee, Olin Corporation 
Chairman and CEO, International Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Chairman, First Insurance and Finance Co., United Security 
Insurance Co. 
Director, Northeastern Insurance Co., Hawkeye Insurance Co., 
United Security Insurance Co., International Bank, 
International General Industries Inc., General Service Life 
Co. and Bankers Security L i e  Co. 
Founder, United Federal Savings and Loan Association 
Chairman, I.B. Credit Corporation, Avis Industrial Corp, 
Woodman Co. and Kliklok Corp., NYC 
Member of the Shriners, Metropolitan, Army-Navy and 
Washington Golf and Country Clubs 
David Packard 
H. Chapman Rose 
Charles E. Sa l tman  
Richard Mellon Scaife 
Lloyd H. Smith 
Arthur Temple 
Charls E. Walker 
Chairman of the Board, Hewlett-Packard Co. 
Former Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Director, Gentech, Boeing Co. 
Member, Trilateral Commission, Atlantic Council, American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Board of Overseers, Hoover Institute, Business Roundtable 
Trustee, Herbert Hoover Foundation, Stanford University 
Member of the Bohemian Grove, Commonwealth, Pacific Union, 
Worldtrade, Links, Alfalfa, Capital Hill, and California Clubs 
Former Under Secretary of the Treasury 
Board of Directors, Atlantic Council 
Trustee Emeritus, Princeton University, Brookings Institute 
Member of the Union, Tavern, Kirtland Country, Princeton, 
Metropolitan, Burning Tree and Chevy Chase Clubs 
Partner, Goldman, Sachs & Co. 
Former Under Secretary of State for Administration 
Partner, Henry Sears and Co. (1949-56) 
Member, English Speaking Union of the U.S. (Pres., 1961-66) 
Member of the University, Union, Downtown Association, 
Century Association, and Pilgrim Clubs 
Publisher, Tribune-Review 
Director, Sarah Scaife Foundation 
President, Paraffin Oil Corporation 
Vice President, Argus Research Corp. 
Executive Director, City National Bank, Houston 
Director, National Review, Curtiss-Wright Corp., Info Storage 
Systems, Falcon Seaboard Inc. 
Trustee, Pine Mountain College 
Member of the Bayou, Ramada, Tejas, Everglades, Racquet and 
Tennis, Brook, River, National Golf, Links, Southampton, and 
Meadow Clubs 
Chairman of the Board, President and C.E.O., Temple-Eastex 
Inc. 
Charls E. Walker Associates, Inc. 
Former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury 
Vice President, Republic National Bank, Dallas 
Executive Vice President, Bankers Association, NYC 
Director, Enron Corp., Potomac Electric Power Co., Tracor Inc., 
and USF&G Corp. 
Chairman, American Council for Capital Formation 
Co-Chairman, Bretton Woods Committee 
Member, Council on Foreign Relations 
Member of the Union League, Burning Tree, and Congressional 
Clubs 
Figure 2. 
Committee on the Present Danger Appointees to President Reagan's Administration a s  of 1985* 
CPD Director Name Administrative Post 
Kenneth L. Adelman 
Richard V. Allen 
Martin Anderson 
James L. Buckley 
W. Glenn Campbell** 
William J. Casey 
John B. Connally 
Joseph D. Douglass, Jr .  
John S. Foster, Jr .  
Amoretta M. Hoeber 
Fred Charles Ikle 
Max M. Kampelrnan 
Geoffrey Kemp 
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick 
John F. Lehman 
Clare Boothe Luce 
Paul H. Nitze 
Edward E. Noble 
Michael Novak 
Peter O'Donnell, Jr. 
Richard N. Perle 
Richard Pipes 
Eugene V. Rostow 
Paul Seabury 
George P. Shultz 
R. G. Stilwell 
Robert Strausz-Hupe 
Charles Tyroler, I1 
William R. Van Cleave 
Charls E. Walker 
Seymour Weiss 
Edward Bennett Williams 
US Deputy Representative to the UN 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 
Assistant to the President for Policy Development 
Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and 
Technology 
Chairman, The Intelligence Oversight Board 
Member, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 
Director, CIA 
Member, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 
Assistant Director, ACDA 
Member, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and 
Development 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
Chairman, US Delegation to Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe 
Staff, National Security Council 
US Representative to the UN 
Secretary of the Navy 
Member, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board , 
Chief Negotiator for Theater Nuclear Forces 
Chairman, US Synthetic Fuels Corporation 
US Representative on the Human Rights Commission of the 
Economic and Social Council of the TJN 
Member President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy 
Staff, National Security Council 
Director, ACDA 
Member, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 
Chairman, President's Economic Policy Advisory Board 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
Ambassador to Turkey 
Member, The Intelligence Oversight Board 
Chairman-Designate, General Advisory Committee, ACDA 
Member, President's Economic Policy Advisory Board 
Member, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 
Member, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 
* Adapted from The Committee on the Present Danger (1985). 
** Individuals with direct affiliations with New Right foundations and thinktanks described by 
Himrnelstein (1990) and Allen (1989; 1987) are shown in bold face type. 
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